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Abstract—Understanding smart grid cyber attacks is key
for developing appropriate protection and recovery measures.
Advanced attacks pursue maximized impact at minimized costs
and detectability. This paper conducts risk analysis of combined
data integrity and availability attacks against the power system
state estimation. We compare the combined attacks with pure
integrity attacks - false data injection (FDI) attacks. A security
index for vulnerability assessment to these two kinds of attacks is
proposed and formulated as a mixed integer linear programming
problem. We show that such combined attacks can succeed with
fewer resources than FDI attacks. The combined attacks with
limited knowledge of the system model also expose advantages
in keeping stealth against the bad data detection. Finally, the
risk of combined attacks to reliable system operation is evaluated
using the results from vulnerability assessment and attack impact
analysis. The findings in this paper are validated and supported
by a detailed case study.
Index Terms—Combined integrity and availability attack, false
data injection, risk analysis, power system state estimation
I. Introduction
THE increasingly digitized power system offers more data,details, and controls in a real-time fashion than its non-
networked predecessors. One of the benefiting applications
of this development is State Estimation (SE): Remote Termi-
nal Units (RTUs) provide measurement data via Information
and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure such as
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system.
The SE provides the operator with an estimate of the state
of the electric power system. This state information is then
used and processed by the energy management system (EMS)
for optimal power flow (OPF), contingency analysis (CA),
and automatic generation control (AGC). Security of supply
depends on the EMS, which in turn depends on a reliable SE.
As discussed in [1], the SCADA system is vulnerable
to a large number of security threats. A class of integrity
data attack, known as false data injection (FDI) attack, has
been studied with considerable attention. With modifying the
measurement data, this attack can pass the Bad Data Detection
(BDD) within SE to keep stealth [2], by tampering of RTUs,
the communication links to the control center, or even the
databases and IT software in the control center. However,
such FDI attack needs intensive attack resources such as the
knowledge of the system model and the capability to corrupt
the integrity on a set of measurements. Denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks [3] [4], a type of availability attack, are much
“cheaper” to achieve, especially if RTUs communicate via
insecure communication channels. In this paper, we focus on
combined attacks where the SE is corrupted by both integrity
attacks and availability attacks simultaneously. We compare
combined attacks and FDI attacks under different levels of
adversarial knowledge and resources.
A. State of the Art
Research in the literature has focused on FDI attacks
from many aspects of risk assessment [5], e.g., vulnerability
analysis, attack impact assessment and mitigation schemes
development. As first shown in [2], a class of FDI attack,
so-called stealth attack, can perturb the state estimate without
triggering alarms in BDD within SE. Vulnerability of SE to
stealth FDI attacks is usually quantified by computing attack
resources needed by the attacker to alter specific measurements
and keep stealth against the BDD [6]–[8].
Since state estimates are inputs of many application specific
tools in EMS, the corrupted estimates can infect further control
actions. The estimate errors due to FDI attacks were analyzed
in [9] and [10]. The results illustrate that the errors could be
significant even with a small number of measurements being
compromised. The work in [11] and [12] studied the potential
economic impact of FDI attacks against SE by observing the
nodal price of market operation. The attacker could obtain
economic gain or cause operating costs in the market. Recent
work in [13] studied the physical impact of FDI attacks with
the attacker’s goal to cause a line overflow.
In order to defend against stealth FDI attacks, mitigation
schemes have been proposed to improve the bad data detection
algorithm or safeguard certain measurements from adversarial
data injection. Sequential detection (or quickest detection)
of FDI attacks was designed mainly based on well-known
Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm in [14]. In reference
[15], detection methods that leverage synchrophasor data and
other forecast information were presented. The network layer
and application layer mitigation schemes, such as multi-path
routing and data authentication and protection, are proved to
be effective to decrease the vulnerability [16] [17].
It is worth noting that the majority of research has focused
on stealth FDI attacks from a specific aspect of vulnerability
or impact assessment. The work in [4] first considered adding
a class of availability attack, so-called jamming attack, to the
attack scenarios against SE. Our recent paper [17] studied the
stealth combined attacks with different measurement routing
topologies, concluding that such attacks may need less attack
resources than FDI attacks. The work above assumed that the
adversary has full knowledge of the system model, yielding
perfect stealth attacks. However, the data of the system model
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2is usually protected well and hard to be accessed by the adver-
sary. In reality, the attacks are always executed with limited
adversarial knowledge and have the possibility to be detected
by the BDD under limited knowledge conditions. Thus for the
vulnerability analysis, not only the attack resources needed
by the attacker should be considered but also the detection
probability of attacks needs to be computed. In addition,
vulnerability and impact of attacks can be combined together
in the notion of risk. In [18], a high-level risk assessment
methodology for power system applications including SE was
presented. However, risk analysis methods and tools combin-
ing vulnerability and impact assessment for data attacks are
needed to implement risk assessment methodologies.
In this paper, we extend our prior work reported in [17] to
formulate combined attacks with limited adversarial knowl-
edge of the system model and conduct the risk analysis. In
order to assess the risk, we first analyze vulnerability of SE
with respect to attack resources needed by the adversary and
calculate the detection probability of combined attacks. Next,
we propose attack impact metric for evaluating attack impact
on load estimate. Combining the results from vulnerability
and impact assessment, we present the risk which combined
attacks bring to reliable system operation. We compare the
vulnerability, impact and risk with those of FDI attacks. The
simulation results show that combined attacks yield higher risk
in majority of considered cases.
B. Contributions and Outline
As far as we know, our work is the first one to conduct
risk analysis of combined attacks with limited adversarial
knowledge. Our contributions are listed as follows:
1) The first part of vulnerability analysis is presented
through the notion of security index [7], which corre-
sponds to the minimum attack resources needed by the
attacker to compromise the measurements while keeping
stealth. The power system is more vulnerable to attacks
with smaller security index since such attacks can be exe-
cuted with less resources. We show that, when availability
attack and integrity attack have the same cost, the security
indexes of combined attacks and FDI attacks coincide.
2) Our second contribution is to address the detection
probability problem of combined attacks with limited
adversarial knowledge. Here we relax the full knowledge
assumption which is commonly used in the literature.
We show that the optimal combined attack with limited
adversarial knowledge can still keep stealth under cer-
tain conditions. The empirical results also indicate that
combined attacks have lower detection probability.
3) We propose risk metric to quantify the risk of combined
attacks with limited adversarial knowledge. For the at-
tacks with the same security index, the risk metric is
computed by multiplying 1) the probability of the attack
not to be detected, with 2) the attack impact on load
estimate. We particularly consider the attack impact on
load estimate because the load estimates are inputs of
other applications that compute optimal control actions in
EMS. Based on the analysis of risk metrics of combined
attacks and FDI attacks, we show that power system
operations face higher risk under combined attacks.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II gives
an introduction of SE and stealth FDI attacks mechanism.
Section III extends the attack scenario to combined attacks
and proposes security index with computational method for
vulnerability analysis. In Section IV, the detectability of com-
bined attacks with limited adversarial knowledge is discussed.
The risk metric is proposed to measure the risk of attacks in
Section V with the analysis of the vulnerability and attack
impact. Section VI presents empirical results from a power
system use case. In section VII we conclude the paper.
C. Notation
For an m× n matrix H ∈ Rm×n, we denote the i-th row of
H by H(i, :). For a vector of m values a ∈ Rm, a(i) is the i-th
entry of a. By diag(a), we denote an m×m diagonal matrix
with the elements of vector a on the main diagonal.
II. Power System Model and Data Attacks
In this section, we review the state estimation and BDD
techniques and the stealth data attacks problem.
A. State Estimation
The power system we consider has n + 1 buses and nt
transmission lines. The data collected by RTUs includes line
power flow and bus power injection measurements. These m
measurements are denoted by z = [z1, . . . ,zm]T . The system
state x is the vector of phase angles and voltage magnitudes
at all buses except the reference bus whose phase angle is
set to be zero. For the analysis of cyber security and bad data
detection in SE, it is customary to describe the dependencies of
measurements and system state through an approximate model
called DC power flow model [8]. In the DC power flow model,
all the voltage magnitudes are assumed to be constant and
the reactive power is completely neglected. Thus the vector
z refers to active power flow and injection measurements,
and the state x refers to bus phase angles only. There are n
phase angles to be estimated excluding the reference one, i.e.
x = [x1, . . . , xn]T . Hence, z and x are related by the equation
z = P
 WB
T
−WBT
B0WBT
 x + e := Hx + e, (1)
where e∼N(0,R) is the measurement noise vector of indepen-
dent zero-mean Gaussian variables with the covariance matrix
R = diag(σ21, . . . ,σ
2
m), H ∈ Rm×n represents the system model,
depending on the topology of the power network, the line
parameters and the placement of RTUs. Here the topology
is described by a directed incidence matrix B0 ∈ R(n+1)×nt in
which the directions of the lines can be arbitrarily specified
[8]. Matrix B ∈Rn×nt is the truncated incidence matrix with the
row in B0 corresponding to the reference bus removed. The
line parameters are described by a diagonal matrix W ∈ Rnt×nt
with diagonal entries being the reciprocals of transmission line
reactance. Matrix P ∈ Rm×(2nt+n+1) is a matrix stacked by the
3rows of identity matrices, indicating which power flows or bus
injections are measured. Usually a large degree of redundancy
of measurements is employed to make H full rank.
The state estimate xˆ is obtained by the following weighted
least squares (WLS) estimate:
xˆ := argmin
x
(z−Hx)T R−1(z−Hx), (2)
which can be solved as xˆ = (HT R−1H)−1HT R−1z := Kz.
The estimated state xˆ can be used to estimate the active
power flows and injections by
zˆ = Hxˆ = HKz := Tz, (3)
where T is the so-called hat matrix [19]. The BDD scheme
uses such estimated measurements to identify bad data by
comparing zˆ with z, see below.
B. Bad Data Detection
Measurement data may be corrupted by random errors. Thus
there is a built-in BDD scheme in EMS for bad data detection.
The BDD is achieved by hypothesis tests using the statistical
properties of the measurement residual:
r = z− zˆ = (I−T )z := S z = S e, (4)
where r ∈ Rm is the residual vector, I ∈ Rm×m is an identity
matrix and S is the so-called residual sensitivity matrix [19].
We now introduce the J(xˆ)-test based BDD. For the mea-
surement error e ∼ N(0,R), the new random variable y =
m∑
i
R−1ii e
2
i where Rii is the diagonal entry of the covariance ma-
trix R has a χ2 distribution with m−n degrees of freedom. Note
the quadratic cost function J(xˆ) = ‖R−1/2r‖22 = ‖R−1/2S e‖22. For
the independent m measurements we have rank(S ) = m− n,
which implies that J(xˆ) has a so-called generalized chi-squared
distribution with m−n degrees of freedom [20]. The BDD uses
the quadratic function as an approximation of y and checks
if it follows the distribution χ2m−n. Defining α ∈ [0,1] as the
significance level corresponding to the false alarm rate, and
τ(α) such that ∫ τ(α)
0
f (x)dx = 1−α, (5)
where f (x) is the probability distribution function (PDF) of
χ2m−n. Hence, the BDD scheme becomes{
Good data, if ‖R−1/2r‖2 ≤ √τ(α),
Bad data, if ‖R−1/2r‖2 > √τ(α), (6)
C. Stealth FDI Attacks
The goal of an attacker is to perturb the SE while re-
maining hidden from the BDD. If only data integrity attacks
are considered, the attacker could inject false data on a set
of measurements, modifying the measurement vector z into
za := z+a. Here the FDI attack vector a ∈Rm is the corruption
added to the original measurement z. We have the following
definition of a ka-tuple FDI attack,
Definition 1 (ka-tuple FDI attack). An attack with an FDI
attack vector a ∈Rm is called a ka-tuple FDI attack if a number
of ka measurements are injected with false data, i.e. ‖a‖0 = ka.
As shown in [2], an attacker with full knowledge of the
system model (i.e., the matrix H) and the capability to corrupt
specific measurements can keep steath if the FDI attack vector
follows a = Hc where c ∈ Rn is non-zero. The corrupted
measurements za becomes za = H(x + c) + e. This leads to the
state estimate perturbed by a degree of c, while the residual for
BDD checking remains the same. It has been verified that such
stealth FDI attacks based on the DC model can be performed
on a real SCADA/EMS testbed avoiding the bad data detection
with full nonlinear AC power flow model [9].
To describe the vulnerability of SE to stealth FDI attacks,
the security index is introduced as the minimum number of
measurements that need to be corrupted by the attacker in
order to keep stealth [7]. The security index is given by
α j :=min
c
‖a‖0
s.t. a = Hc, a( j) = µ,
(7)
where a( j) denotes the injected false data on measurement
j, and µ is the non-zero attack magnitude determined by the
attacker. The result α j is the security index that quantifies the
vulnerability of measurement j to stealth FDI attacks. Here
the computed α j belongs to one of the FDI attacks with the
minimum ka (ka = α j) for measurement j. It is known that
this optimization problem above is NP-hard (See [21]). In [8],
the authors proposed an approach using the big M method
to express (7) as a mixed integer linear programming (MILP)
problem which can be solved with an appropriate solver,
α j := min
c,y
m∑
i=1
y(i)
s.t. Hc ≤ My, (8a)
−Hc ≤ My, (8b)
H( j, :)c = µ, (8c)
y(i) ∈ {0,1} for all i.
In (8), M is a constant scalar that is greater than the
maximum absolute value of entries in Hc∗, for some optimal
solution c∗ of (7). At optimality, for any i that |H(i, :)c∗|= 0, the
corresponding y(i) is zero. Thus an optimal solution to (8) is
exactly the same optimal solution to (7) with y(i) = 1 indicating
that the measurement i is corrupted by an FDI attack.
III. Stealth Combined Data Attacks
FDI attacks are resource-intensive since the adversary needs
to coordinate integrity attacks on a specific number of mea-
surements. This usually gives the adversary more power than
possible in practice [10]. In reality, an attacker would try to
reduce the attack resources and would prefer data availability
attacks (e.g., DoS attacks, jamming attacks) since monitoring
systems are always more vulnerable to this type of attacks
[22]. Thus, we focus on the scenario that the adaversary would
launch combined data integrity and availability attacks.
A. Combined Data Integrity and Availability Attacks
For a large-scale SCADA system, missing data and failing
RTUs are common [7]. When some of the measurements
4are missing, the typical solution widely employed widely
in SE is to use the remaining data before the system be-
comes “unobservable”. Another solution is to use pseudo
measurements (e.g., previous data, forecast information), but
these measurements would still lose confidence in further
time intervals as long as the availability attacks continue. The
combined attacks we introduce here are assumed not to make
system unobservable and lead to non-convergence of the SE
algorithm but try to keep stealth against the BDD. Thus we
keep the assumption in this paper that SE uses remaining data
if availability attacks take place. We introduce the availability
attack vector d ∈ {0,1}m for the availability attacks and d(i) = 1
means that measurement i is unavailable. Thus the model for
remaining measurements and system state can be described by
zd = Hd x + ed, (9)
where ed ∈ Rm and zd ∈ Rm are the noise vector and mea-
surement vector respectively, and the entries of them are zero
if the corresponding measurements are unavailable. Matrix
Hd ∈ Rm×n denotes the model of the remaining measurements
and it is obtained from H by replacing some rows with zero
row vectors due to availability attacks on these measurements,
i.e. Hd := (I−diag(d))H. We can further obtain the hat matrix
and residual sensitivity matrix when availability attacks occur,
Kd := (HTd R
−1Hd)−1HTd R
−1, (10)
Td := HdKd, S d := I−Td. (11)
For the combined attacks, the attacker would still launch
FDI attacks on the remaining measurements in concert with
availability attacks, making zd changed into za,d := zd + a.
Similarly, a (ka,kd)-tuple combined attack can be defined as
Definition 2 ((ka,kd)-tuple combined attack). A combined
attack with an FDI attack vector a ∈ Rm and an availability
attack vector d ∈ {0,1}m described above is called a (ka,kd)-
tuple combined attack if ‖a‖0 = ka, ‖d‖0 = kd.
B. Security Index for Combined Attacks
Similar to the FDI attacks, if the attack vectors of a (ka,kd)-
tuple attack satisfy a = Hdc, such combined attacks can still
keep stealth as the FDI attack vector a lies on the column space
of the matrix Hd. Using the formulation of security index in
(7) for FDI attacks, we propose an intuitive security index for
combined attacks as the minimum number of measurements
that need to be compromised by the attacker,
β j := min
c,d
‖a‖0 + ‖d‖0
s.t. a = Hdc, (12a)
Hd = (I−diag(d))H, (12b)
a( j) = µ, (12c)
d(i) ∈ {0,1} for all i.
Here we also assume a( j) = µ where µ is the non-zero attack
magnitude. The result β j is the security index that quantifies
how vulnerable measurement j is to combined attacks. The
computed β j belongs to one of the combined attacks that have
minimum ka +kd (ka +kd = β j) for measurement j. To solve this
NP-hard problem above, we propose a computation solution
which uses the big M method to formulate a MILP problem:
β
′
j := minc,w,d
m∑
i=1
w(i) +
m∑
k=1
d(k)
s.t. Hc ≤ M(w + d), (13a)
−Hc ≤ M(w + d), (13b)
H( j, :)c = µ, (13c)
w(i) ∈ {0,1} for all i, (13d)
d(k) ∈ {0,1} for all k, (13e)
where w,d ∈ {0,1}m with w(i) = 1 and d(k) = 1 meaning FDI
attack and data availability attack on measurement i and k.
The following theorem shows that the optimal solution to
(12) can be obtained from the optimal solution of (13).
Theorem 1. For any index j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and non-zero µ, let
(c∗, w∗, d∗) be an optimal solution to (13). Then an optimal
solution to (12) can be computed as (c∗, d∗), and β′j = β j.
Proof. The proof follows by re-writing (12) as (13). First,
note that the constraint of (12), a = (I − diag(d))Hc, can be
formulated as a set of inequality constraints with auxiliary
binary variables by using the big M method, yielding −Mw ≤
(I − diag(d))Hc ≤ Mw, where w ∈ {0,1}m and ‖a‖0 = ∑w(i).
Since d is a vector of binary variables, the pair of inequality
constraints pertaining the i-th measurement can be written as
|(1−d(i))H(i, :)c| ≤ Mw(i). The latter can be read as{
H(i, :)c = 0, if w(i) = d(i) = 0,
|H(i, :)c| ≤ M, if w(i) = 1 or d(i) = 1,
which can be rewritten as |H(i, :)c| ≤ M(d(i) + w(i)). Hence,
recalling that a(i) = (1 − d(i))H(i, :)c, we conclude that the
constraints of (12) can be equivalently re-written as the
constraints of (13). The proof concludes by noting that the
objective functions of both problems satisfy the equality
‖a‖0 + ‖d‖0 =∑w(i) +∑d(i). 
Corollary 1.1. For any index j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and non-zero µ, let
(c∗, w∗, d∗) be an optimal solution to (13). Then an optimal
solution to (7) can be computed as c∗, and α j = β j.
Proof. The proof follows straightforwardly from Theorem 1,
which establishes that an optimal solution to (12) can be
obtained from an optimal solution to (13): comparing (13)
and (8), we can easily see that an optimal solution to (8) can
be computed as (c∗, y∗) with y∗ = w∗+ d∗, and α j = β
′
j. Since
(8) provides the exact solution to (7), an optimal solution to
(7) can be computed as c∗, and also α j = β
′
j = β j. 
Corollary 1.1 implies that a set of compromised measure-
ments is an optimal solution to (12) if and only if this set
is an optimal solution to (7), and the two security indexes β j
and α j coincide. In fact, in [23] it was shown that the set of
compromised measurements in a ka-tuple FDI attack obtained
by solving (7) is a sparsest critical tuple containing the target
measurement j. A sparsest critical tuple is characterized by
the measurements that do not belong to a critical tuple of
lower order. A critical tuple contains a set of measurements,
5where removal all of them will cause the system to be
unobservable. If any subset of the critical tuple is removed,
it would not lead to the loss of observability [19]. According
to Corollary 1.1 and its proof, we can see that the set of
compromised measurements of FDI attacks in this critical
tuple is also an optimal solution to the security index problem
(12) of combined attacks. The interpretation of the security
index problem as a critical tuple problem provides the means
for comparing security indexes of attacks with full and limited
adversarial knowledge; see Section IV-C for details.
The security indexes derived so far in (7) and (12) could
identify the compromised measurements set of attacks but did
not consider the attack costs. In what follows, we include the
costs in the formulation. To simplify the discussion, we assume
that the availability and integrity attacks have the costs CA and
CI , respectively, per measurement. The worst case for power
grids is that the adversary succeeds with minimum attack
resources. Under these attack costs, we formulate a security
index for attack resources of combined attacks as
γa,dj :=minc,w,d
m∑
i=1
CIw(i) +
m∑
k=1
CAd(k)
s.t. (13a)− (13e).
(14)
By making vector d in (14) to be zero, we can get the
security index γaj for FDI attacks. We can also see that the set
of compromised measurements from the optimal solution of
(14) is also the optimal solution to (12) and (7). As previously
discussed, it is reasonable to assume that availability attacks
can cost less attack resources compared with integrity attacks.
If we take the values that satisfy CA <CI , the optimal solution
of w∗ and d∗ in (14), w.r.t. measurement j, would lead
to
∑
w∗(i) = 1 and
∑
d∗(k) = β j − 1. This means that the
optimal combined attack in the case of CA < CI is to corrupt
one measurement with an integrity attack and make other
measurements in this critical tuple unavailable. This statement
is made formal in the following proposition which will be
validated in Section VI-A.
Proposition 1. When CA < CI , the optimal strategy of com-
bined attack is to inject false data on the targeted measurement
j and make other measurements in the critical tuple unavail-
able to the SE, yielding a (1,β j−1)-tuple combined attack with
optimal attack cost γa,dj = CI + (β j−1)CA.
IV. Attacks with Limited Adversarial Knowledge
In this section we consider the scenario in which the
adversary has limited knowledge of the system model and
discuss how this affects the detectability of combined attacks.
A. Relaxing Assumption on Adversarial Knowledge
For the combined attacks above, the adversary is assumed
to have full knowledge of H in (1) that includes the topol-
ogy of the power network, the placement of RTUs and the
transmission line reactance. This system data is usually kept
in the database of control center, which is difficult to be
accessed by the attacker. We extend the previous analysis
by replacing the full knowledge assumption. Hence, in what
follows the attacker only has limited knowledge of the system
model. An attacker could acquire limited knowledge as a result
of analyzing an out-dated or estimated model using power
network topoloy data but limitd information of transmission
line parameters [24] [25].
Looking at the problem from the attacker’s perspective, we
denote the perturbed system model as H˜, such that
H˜ = H +∆H, (15)
where ∆H ∈ Rm×n denotes the part of model uncertainty. We
still consider that the attacker uses the same linear policies to
compute attack vectors, i.e. a = H˜dc for combined attacks and
a = H˜c for FDI attacks and H˜d := (I−diag(d))H˜.
B. Detectability of Data Attacks
1) Combined Attacks: When the measurements are cor-
rupted by a (ka,kd)-tuple attack, the measurement residual
r(a,d) can be written as
r(a,d) = S dza,d = S ded + S da. (16)
As discussed in Section III-B, when the attack vectors of the
combined attack satisfy a = Hdc, the residual r(a,d) = S ded +
S dHdc = S ded due to S dHd = 0, then the residual is not affected
by a and no additional alarms are triggered; the BDD treats
the measurements attacked by availability attacks as a case of
missing data. However, for the attack with limited knowledge,
the attack vector a becomes a = H˜dc and S da may be non-
zero. In this case, the residual is incremented and the attack
can be detected with some possibility.
Note that the quadratic cost function with the combined
attack becomes Ja,d(xˆ) = ‖R−1/2S ded + R−1/2S da‖22. Here the
mean of (R−1/2S ded + R−1/2S da) is non-zero R−1/2S da incre-
mented by the attack. Recalling the J(xˆ)-test based BDD,
Ja,d(xˆ) has a generalized non-central chi-squared distribution
with m−n−kd degrees of freedom under the combined attack.
We use Ja,d(xˆ) as an approximation of having the non-central
chi-squared distribution χ2m−n−kd (‖R−1/2S da‖22) to calculate the
detection probability, where λa,d = ‖R−1/2S da‖22 is the non-
centrality parameter. Further we will validate such approxi-
mation using empirical results from Monte Carlo simulation
in Section VI-B. We can further obtain∫ τd(α)
0
fλa,d (x)dx = 1−δa,d, (17)
where fλa,d (x) is the PDF of χ
2
m−n−kd (‖R−1/2S da‖22), τd(α) is
the threshold set in the BDD using (5) but with the PDF of
χ2m−n−kd , and δa,d is the detection probability.
2) FDI Attacks: For a ka-tuple FDI attack with limited
knowledge, the quadratic function Ja(xˆ) can also be ap-
proximated to have a non-central chi-squared distribution
but with m− n degrees of freedom, namely the distribution
χ2m−n(‖R−1/2S a‖22). Similar to (17), the detection probability
can be computed by solving∫ τ(α)
0
fλa (x)dx = 1−δa, (18)
where λa = ‖R−1/2S a‖22 denotes the non-centrality parameter,
τ(α) is the threshold set in the BDD using (5), and δa is the
detection probability of the FDI attack.
6C. Special Case: Attacks with Structured Model Uncertainty
An interesting analysis can be made to understand what the
model uncertainty ∆H is to the adversary. As stated in [24],
the scenarios where the uncertainty is more structured are of
greater interest. Here we assume that the attacker knows the
exact topology of the power network and the placement of
RTUs, but has to estimate the line parameters. This assumption
is feasible since the attacker can analyze the topology accord-
ing to the breaker status data and compute the model based on
available power flow measurements, while usually the attacker
has limited access to the knowledge of the exact length of the
transmission line and type of the conductor being used [25].
Thus the model with such structured uncertainty becomes
H˜ = P
 W˜B
T
−W˜BT
B0W˜BT
 . (19)
where W˜ is derived from W but with errors. Now we consider
the security index of attacks w.r.t. H˜ in (19). As we have
discussed in Section III-B, the security index problem can be
interpreted as a critical tuple problem. In the remaining part
of this paper we adopt the following assumption,
Assumption 1. The system with perturbed model H˜ in (19)
has the same sets of critical tuples as the system with original
model H in (1).
Assumption 1 is expected to hold in the case that the system
with H in (1) is topologically observable [26]. Defining the
security indexes for compromised measurements set under
structured uncertainty model as α˜ j and β˜ j, the following
theorem shows that the security index remains the same
although the model is perturbed with structured uncertainty.
Theorem 2. For any measurement index j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and
non-zero µ, under Assumption 1, let (c˜∗, w˜∗, d˜∗) be an optimal
solution to (13) w.r.t. H˜ in (19). Then there exists some c∗
such that (c∗, w∗, d∗) with w∗ = w˜∗ and d∗ = d˜∗ is an optimal
solution to (13) w.r.t. H in (1), (c∗, y∗) with y∗ = w˜∗+ d˜∗ is an
optimal solution to (8) w.r.t. H in (1), and β˜ j = β j = α j = α˜ j.
Proof. The optimal solution with w˜∗ and d˜∗ identifies a spars-
est critical tuple containing measurement j for the perturbed
model H˜ in (19), which is also a sparsest critical tuple for the
model H in (1) according to Assumption 1. Then the set of
measurements in this critical tuple is an optimal solution to
the security index problem of (13) w.r.t. H in (1). According
to Theorem 1 and Corollary 1.1, the set of measurements in
this critical tuple is also an optimal solution to the security
index problem of (8) w.r.t. H in (1). 
With respect to the security index for attack resources, let
γ˜a,dj and γ˜
a
j be the security indexes of combined attacks and
FDI attacks from (14) but w.r.t. perturbed model H˜ in (19).
We can see that the set of compromised measurements from
optimal solution to (14) w.r.t. H˜ in (19) is also the optimal
solution to (13) and (8) according to Theorem 2. When it is
the case that CA <CI , the optimal solution of w˜∗ and d˜∗ from
(14) w.r.t. H˜, would lead to
∑
w˜∗(i) = 1 and
∑
d˜∗(k) = β˜ j −1.
Such (1,β˜ j − 1)-tuple combined attack can be launched with
least attack resources when CA < CI and in the following we
show that it also can achieve minimized detectability.
As discussed in Section IV-B, the detection probability
would increase when attacker has limited knowledge of the
system model. However, for the combined attacks, the follow-
ing proposition states that the combined attacks with structured
model uncertainty can still keep stealth against the BDD if
the following conditions are satisfied: 1) structured model
uncertainty is defined as in (19); 2) Assumption 1 holds.
Proposition 2. For any index j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and non-zero µ,
under Assumption 1, let (c˜∗, w˜∗, d˜∗) with
∑
w˜∗(i) = 1 be an
optimal solution to (13) w.r.t. H˜ in (19). Then this (1,β˜ j −1)-
tuple combined attack from (c˜∗, w˜∗, d˜∗) is a stealth attack.
Proof. The FDI attack vector of this combined attack is a =
H˜d˜∗ c˜
∗. According to Theorem 2, there exists c∗ such that (c∗,
w∗, d∗) with w∗ = w˜∗ and d∗ = d˜∗ is an optimal solution to (13)
w.r.t. H in (1). Using the attack strategy above, ka =
∑
w˜∗(i) = 1
and the only non-zero entry of the attack vector a is µ
while other measurements in this critical tuple are attacked
by availability attacks. Thus this combined attack is with the
vector a = (I−diag(d˜∗))H˜c˜∗ = (I−diag(d∗))Hc∗ = Hd∗c∗, which
can keep stealth w.r.t. H in (1). 
V. Risk Assessment for Data Attacks
The previous sections focus on vulnerability assessment of
SE to combined attacks with limited knowledge. Following the
procedure of risk analysis in [18], in this section we define and
analyze the risk brought by attacks with limited knowledge.
Usually the total risk of data attacks is defined as the
likelihood of attack multiplied by the potential attack impact
[5]. For a (ka,kd)-tuple combined attack, the risk metric R(a,d)
can be expressed as
R(a,d) = L(a,d)∗ I(a,d) (20)
where L(a,d) denotes the likelihood of the combined attack
with attack vectors a and d, and I(a,d) denotes the attack
impact. For the attacks with larger risk metrics, they bring
more risk to reliable system operation. In the following we
discuss how L(a,d) and I(a,d) are formulated.
A. Likelihood of Data Attacks
The attack likelihood relates to the vulnerability of the
system. In this work, the likelihood of the attack is taken as
the probability that the attack is launched and the probability
that the attack can keep stealth against the detection schemes,
L(a,d) = P(a,d)P(s|a,d), (21)
where P(s|a,d) denotes the conditional probability of the
combined attack passing the BDD if it has been performed. For
the attack with limited knowledge, the detection probability
δa,d can be obtained from (17), thus we have P(s|a,d) = 1−δa,d.
In (21), P(a,d) represents the probability that a particular
adversary would perform a combined attack and successfully
corrupt the data. Obtaining meaningful and realistic data
for calculating P(a,d) remains an unsolved and open issue
for most of the established approaches [27]. The proposed
7security index γ˜a,dj w.r.t. perturbed model H˜ captures the efforts
required by a combined attack and essentially can be related
to the probability P(a,d). We assume that if the attacks have
the same security index of γ˜a,dj , they have the same probability
of P(a,d). In this paper, to compare the risk of attacks with
the same security index, we “normalize” P(a,d) to be 1,
meaning that the attacks have been performed successfully.
The following risk metric applies to the attacks with the same
security index of γ˜a,dj ,
R(a,d) = P(a,d)P(s|a,d)I(a,d) = (1−δa,d)I(a,d), (22)
For the ka-tuple FDI attacks with the same security index
of γ˜aj , the formulation of risk metric is similar, i.e. R(a) =
(1− δa)I(a) where δa is the detection probability from (18),
I(a) denotes the attack impact and R(a) is the risk metric.
Thus in the case of γ˜a,dj = γ˜
a
j , the risk of combined attacks
and FDI attacks is comparable.
B. Attack Impact: Errors of Load Estimate
The estimated information from SE is used by further
applications in EMS to compute optimal control actions. These
are typically computed by minimizing network operation costs
which are obtained by solving OPF algorithms. As the work in
[13] shows, the OPF application uses the load estimate as the
inputs. If data attacks take place and pass the BDD, the load
estimates get perturbed which influences the control actions.
Therefore, we consider the impact metric as a function of the
bias introduced by the attack on the load estimate.
Assuming that there are min j injection measurements includ-
ing loads, we consider the impact on the errors of estimating
net power injections, which can be described as
 = zˆin j,a,d − zin j, (23)
where zin j ∈ Rmin j is the original injection measurements in-
cluding loads and zˆin j,a,d ∈ Rmin j is the vector of estimated
measurements under a (ka,kd)-tuple combined attack. Thus
 = Hin j xˆa,d − (Hin jx + ein j), (24)
where xˆa,d = Kd(zd +a) = x+Kded +Kda, Hin j ∈Rmin j×n denotes
the submatrix of H by keeping the rows corresponding to
injection measurements including loads, and ein j ∈ Rmin j is the
noise vector of these measurements. We can further obtain
 = Hin jKda + Hin jKded − ein j where the term introduced by
the attacks is Hin jKda. Here Kd is the function of the matrix
Hd as defined in (10). The expected value of  is
E() = Hin jKda. (25)
We have the following definition of the attack impact metric
for combined attacks.
Definition 3. The impact metric I(a,d) for quantifying attack
impact of a combined attack with FDI attack vector a and
availability vector d on load estimate is defined as the 2-norm
of Hin jKda, i.e. I(a,d) := ‖Hin jKda‖2.
Similar to the combined attacks, we define the attack impact
metric I(a) = ‖Hin jKa‖2 for a ka-tuple FDI attack with attack
vector a. We continue to adopt the linear attack policies to
compute attack vectors for attacks with limited knowledge,
i.e., a = H˜dc for combined attacks and a = H˜c for FDI attacks.
, 4a djγ =
, 4a djγ >
, 4a djγ <
Security Index
Figure 1. The IEEE 14-bus system. The measurements are labeled different
colors according to their security index γa,dj from Figure 2. The most
vulnerable measurements with small index (< 4) are color coded red. The
measurements that have large index (> 4) are color coded green. The others
are color coded blue and their vulnerabilities lie somewhere in between. A
similar figure of measurements under FDI attacks can be found in [8].
VI. Case Study
In this section we apply the analysis to the IEEE 14-bus
system (Figure 1). We conduct simulations on DC model for
the purposes of: 1) illustrating vulnerability of SE to combined
attacks;2) providing insights into how combined attack can dif-
fer from FDI attack; 3) evaluating the risk of data attacks and
giving the risk prioritization. In the performed experiments,
measurements are placed on all the buses and transmission
lines to provide large redundancy. The per-unit system is
used and the power base is 100MW. The measurements are
generated under the DC model with Gaussian noise (σ j = 0.02
for any measurement j). For the limited knowledge model,
we assume that the attacker knows the exact topology but has
estimated line parameters with errors up to ±20%.
A. Security Index for Vulnerability Analysis
In order to expose vulnerability of SE to data attacks, we
calculated the security index using the computation solutions
of (13) (according to Theorem 1) and (8) for both combined
attacks and FDI attacks. Thus the minimum number of com-
promised measurements and attack resources needed by the
attacker to corrupt SE and pass the BDD are determined.
Figure 2 shows the security indexes γa,dj and γ
a
j of com-
bined attacks and FDI attacks, where the x-axis indicates the
measurement targeted by the attacker to inject false data of
µ = 0.1p.u.. The results illustrate the attack resources needed
by the attacker to keep stealth. The security index of combined
attacks is also showed in Figure 1 where the measurements
are color coded to indicate which ones are more vulnerable.
Combining Figure 2 and Figure 1, the security index can
illustrate the security week point in a power system.
The values of security index under combined attacks are
smaller than the ones under FDI attacks when CA < CI from
Figure 2. For instance, in order to corrupt measurement j = 9,
the FDI attack needs a value of 11 for attack resources (i.e. a
11-tuple FDI attack) while the combined attack only needs a
value of 6 (i.e. a (1,10)-tuple combined attack). This implies
that SE is more vulnerable to combined attacks with less attack
resources. The results also show that ka = 1 for the combined
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Figure 2. The security index γa,dj under combined attacks and γ
a
j under FDI
attacks are plotted versus measurement index j. Here the cost of FDI attack
on per measurement is assumed to be 1 and CA = 0.5 as CA/CI = 0.5.
attacks and the optimal attack cost is CI + (β j − 1)CA for the
case CA < CI , which is consistent with Proposition 1.
B. Detectability of Attacks with Limited Knowledge
Using the attack policy a = H˜dc for combined attacks and
a = H˜c for FDI attacks with the given model uncertainty, the
detection probability of attacks can be obtained according to
(17) and (18). From Theorem 2 we see that the compromised
measurements set from the optimal solutions of (14) w.r.t.
H˜ in (19) is in the same critical tuple with the one w.r.t.
H in (1). Thus a set of 11 measurements (a critical tuple)
containing measurement j = 9 needs to be compromised by
the attacker from the security index in Figure 2. For the
sake of comparison, the combined attacks and FDI attacks are
performed in the same set of these 11 measurements. Figure 3
shows the detection probability of combined attacks and FDI
attacks targeting these 11 measurements. In addition to the
theoretical results, the empirical detection probability results
are also presented for the 11-tuple FDI attack and (2,9)-tuple
combined attack respectively.
To obtain the empirical detection probability, we use Monte
Carlo simulations. Taking the (2,9)-tuple combined attack as
an example, 200 different points of attack magnitude µ were
taken in random from 0 to 0.5 p.u. and the corresponding
attack vectors were built. For each attack vector with the taken
magnitude µ, total 1000 Monte Carlo runs were executed to
obtain the detection probability of such attack. In each Monte
Carlo simulation, the measurements were created by the DC
model with Gaussian noise and the attack vector was added
to the measurements. For the attacked measurements, the SE
and BDD with the false alarm rate 0.05 were executed.
From Figure 3 we can see that the empirical results of
detection probability follow the theoretical one. This proves
that using the approximation of the distribution of Ja,d(xˆ) and
Ja(xˆ) can provide the detection probability, and it is reliable
to use theoretical detection probability for risk analysis in the
following. The results in Figure 3 illustrate that combined
attacks can have lower detection probability comparing with
FDI attacks, meaning that SE is more vulnerable to combined
attacks as they have higher probability not to be discovered
by the BDD. An interesting result is that with smaller ka the
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Figure 3. The detection probability is plotted versus the attack magnitude.
The attacks are under structured uncertainty model and performed in the set
of 11 measurements and the false alarm rate α is 0.05.
combined attack also has lower probability to be detected.
In the case that ka = 1 and kd = 10, the (1,10)-tuple combined
attack can keep stealth, which is consistent with Proposition 2.
C. Risk Metrics for Attacks
We continue with the risk analysis of combined attacks.
Simulations were conducted on the same scenarios as Section
VI-B where the attacker manipulates the set of 11 measure-
ments (a critical tuple). We analyze the attack impact and
present the risk of the combined attacks and FDI attacks. For
the risk analysis, we take the attack cost values that satisfy
CA = CI , thus the security indexes γ˜
a,d
j and γ˜
a
j w.r.t. H˜ in (19)
of these attacks are equal to each other and the probability
P(a,d) can be “normalized” as discussed in Section IV-B. The
results for attack impact metrics versus detection probability
are given in Figure 4. The values of risk metrics for combined
attacks and FDI attacks are shown in Figure 5.
Under the perturbed model with uncertainty, the attacker has
the possibility to be detected by the BDD while introducing
errors on load estimate. From Figure 4, we see that combined
attacks can have similar attack impact metrics with FDI attacks
but lower detection probability with the same attack magnitude
µ (0.15 p.u. or 0.25 p.u. as shown in Figure 4). Especially the
(1,10)-tuple combined attack has larger impact metrics than
attacks with limited knowledge for the both cases that attack
magnitude µ = 0.15p.u. or µ = 0.25p.u..
For the risk metrics in Figure 5, when the attack magnitude
µ increases from zero, the risk metric increases due to the
low detection probability. After µ reaches certain values, the
risk metric decreases since the attacks can be discovered with
high probability. It’s also shown that combined attacks can
have larger risk metrics especially the cases of (1,10)-tuple
and (2,9)-tuple combined attacks. It should be noted that
though we assume CA = CI to obtain the risk metrics, the risk
prioritization of these attacks in Figure 5 would not change if
CA <CI is assumed. This is because the combined attacks can
be launched with less attack resources when CA <CI , resulting
in larger risk values comparing with FDI attacks.
VII. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we see that combined attacks can succeed with
less resources (if CA < CI) and lower detection probability
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Figure 5. The risk metric is plotted versus the attack magnitude. The
attacks are under structured uncertainty model and performed in the set of 11
measurements. Here we assume CA = CI and false alarm rate α is 0.05.
when the adversarial knowledge is limited, bringing more risk
to reliable system operation. It also should be noted that this
paper assumes that the SE treats unavailable measurements
due to attacks as a case of missing data, although the amount
of missing data under attacks is larger than the one under
normal conditions. In addition, availability attacks like DoS
attacks could trigger alerts on ICT-specific measures (e.g.,
intrusion detection). These two features give the opportunities
to develop better cross-domain detection schemes for avail-
ability portion of the attacks improving the overall combined
attacks detection. Other research directions to explore in the
future include evaluating physical impact of combined attacks
and exploring the vulnerability of other monitoring/control
applications to combined attacks.
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